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VoxTalks Economics

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  • VoxTalks Economics

    S9 Ep64: Growth up, prices up

    20/11/2026 | 27 min
    US data centres will need cables, switches and cooling kit, European factories make that stuff. The AI boom has helped Europe grow faster than expected in 2026. But the European gas price has roughly tripled since the war in the Gulf began, and most households have not yet seen the bill.
    This week in VoxTalks, we are discussing the European Commission's Autumn 2026 Forecast with Laura Bardone and Kristian Orsini from the Commission. Growth is the good news, fuel bill and food inflation aren't going away.
    The research behind this episode:
    European Commission, Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs. 2026. "European Economic Forecast: Autumn 2026." European Economy Institutional Paper 348. Brussels: European Commission.
    To cite this episode:
    Phillips, Tim, Laura Bardone, and Kristian Orsini. 2026. “Growth up, prices up.” VoxTalks Economics .

    About the guests

    Laura Bardone is Head of the Economic Situation, Forecasts, Business and Consumer Surveys Unit in the European Commission's Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs (DG ECFIN), which produces the Commission's economic forecasts. She joined DG ECFIN in 2006, worked on the Italian desk, and later led the unit for Spain and Croatia. Before the Commission, she worked at the OECD and at Eurostat. She studied economics at the Catholic University of Milan.
    Kristian Orsini is an economist in the same unit at DG ECFIN, where he works on the Commission's economic forecasts.
    Research cited in this episode

    European Economic Forecast, Autumn 2026. The Commission publishes two full forecasts a year, in spring and autumn, for every EU member state. This edition, published on 17 November 2026, forecasts EU growth of 1.4% in 2026 and 2027 and 1.5% in 2028, with inflation at 3.3%, 3.2% and 2.3% over the same three years. The euro area follows a similar path at slightly lower rates.
    Title Transfer Facility (TTF). The TTF is a virtual trading hub for natural gas in the Netherlands, and its price is the main benchmark for wholesale gas in Europe. The forecast reports that the TTF price rose from about €30 per megawatt hour in late February to an average of €85 in October. Retail gas and electricity contracts take time to reset, so households feel wholesale price rises months later; Orsini puts the lag at up to a year in some member states.
    The refining bottleneck. Crude oil is not what goes into a car. When shipping through the Strait of Hormuz was disrupted, refinery margins widened sharply as markets for petrol, diesel and other products tightened, a pattern documented in the VoxEU column Energy markets under chokepoint stress: The 2026 Hormuz shock. Orsini says transport fuels account for almost three quarters of the rise in energy inflation so far. Fuel is bought often and prices adjust fast, which is why this part of the shock is so visible.
    Energy inflation. Energy prices in the EU rose by almost 21% year on year in October 2026. The forecast expects headline EU inflation to peak above 4% between the end of 2026 and early 2027. Energy is a small share of total spending, so a rise of that size in energy prices lifts the headline rate by much less.
    The inflation gap between income groups. A quintile is one fifth of households, ranked by income. The forecast includes a special analysis of prices and spending since 2019, across the pandemic and two energy crises. Lower-income households spend a larger share of their budget on food and home energy; higher-income households spend relatively more on transport fuel. Bardone explains that the first months of this shock narrowed the gap between the poorest and richest fifths, because the price rises arrived first at the pump. As household energy bills and food prices rise, the gap could widen again, as it did after Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
    Labour market slack. The unemployment rate counts only people who want a job and are looking for one. Broader measures of slack also count people who work part-time but want more hours, and people who are available to work but have stopped searching. Bardone says slack has increased among young people, although overall EU unemployment remains close to historical lows. The forecast puts it at 6.1% in 2026.
    Energy support measures. Since the conflict began, almost every member state has introduced measures to cushion households and firms from higher energy prices. Bardone says these cost about 0.14% of EU GDP in 2026, and that about three quarters of the support comes as untargeted price measures such as cuts to fuel excise duties. Because higher-income households spend more on transport fuel, they gain most from those cuts. The Commission recommends targeted support that keeps the incentive to use less energy. Under current legislation, most measures end in 2027.
    The AI investment cycle. Large cloud computing companies, often called hyperscalers, are spending heavily on data centres, mostly in the United States. Orsini says the demand extends well beyond semiconductors to the switches, cables, power equipment and cooling systems behind each data centre. Strong exports of this equipment in the second quarter of 2026 were one of the main reasons the Commission revised EU growth upwards.
    Monetary policy. The European Central Bank raised its policy rates by 0.25 percentage points in June 2026 and again in September. The Commission does not forecast ECB decisions; it uses market expectations, which at the forecast's cut-off pointed to three further rises.
    Long-term interest rates and public debt. Yields on long-term government bonds rose in the US, the UK, Japan and several EU member states during 2026. If a government's debt is about 100% of GDP, a rise of one percentage point in the interest rate eventually adds about one percentage point of GDP to annual interest payments, as old debt is refinanced at the new rate. That can cancel out a large part of a government's efforts to reduce its deficit.
    ETS2. ETS2 is a new EU emissions trading system that puts a carbon price on fuels used in buildings and road transport. It was due to start in 2027, but EU lawmakers postponed it to 1 January 2028. Bardone says its effect on consumer prices will be small compared with this year's energy shock, and will vary with each country's heating and transport fuels. In Germany, ETS2 replaces a national scheme with a higher carbon price, so energy prices there could fall when it starts.
    More VoxTalks Economics episodes

    Europe in the Middle. Pol Antras and Beata Javorcik on what Chinese exports diverted from the US mean for European producers and consumers who already face high energy costs.
    Related reading on VoxEU.org

    A more resilient Europe faces a renewed energy shock, a VoxEU column on the Spring 2026 Forecast arguing that Europe entered this shock in a stronger position than in 2021-22, but that broad, untargeted energy subsidies could blunt the incentive to change.
    The different effects of oil and gas supply shocks on euro area inflation, in which Francesco Corsello and Andrea Foschi show that oil shocks hit prices quickly but briefly, while gas shocks spread more widely and last longer.
    The unequal burden of oil shocks: Labour markets and monetary policy, a VoxEU column on which workers bear the cost of an oil shock, and how central banks should respond.
  • VoxTalks Economics

    S9 Ep63: Inflation and the polarisation of reality

    13/11/2026 | 25 min
    In recent years, shoppers in Türkiye do not need the evening news to tell them prices have been rising, because they see it at the till. But the till only tells you about the history of inflation. When they turn on the television, the news might tell them what to expect next, and which channel they choose will matter.
    Orkun Saka (City St George's, University of London) and his co-authors matched a monthly household survey to the transcripts of prime-time news on 13 Turkish channels. He tells Tim Phillips about how the way a channel talks more about inflation, and how often it mentions the word, affects what viewers expect will happen next. Do polarised TV channels lead to a "polarisation of reality"?
    The research behind this episode:
    Demiralp, Selva, Orkun Saka, and Michael Weber. 2026. "Polarized Media and Inflation Expectations." CEPR Discussion Paper 21747. Paris and London: Centre for Economic Policy Research. 
    To cite this episode:
    Phillips, Tim, and Orkun Saka. 2026. “Inflation and the polarisation of reality.” VoxTalks Economics (podcast).

    About the guest

    Orkun Saka is a Reader in Economics at City St George's, University of London. He is also affiliated with the London School of Economics and the CESifo Network. His research spans financial intermediation, international finance and political economy.
    Research cited in this episode

    Turkey's 2022 inflation peak. Annual consumer price inflation in Turkey reached 85.5% in October 2022, according to the Turkish Statistical Institute, its highest level in 24 years. It followed a run of interest rate cuts while inflation was rising. Orkun uses the episode to explain why expectations in Türkiye became so detached from the official figures. See Al-Monitor (2022).
    Heterodox monetary policy. For several years the Turkish government argued that lower interest rates would bring inflation down, the reverse of the textbook view. In the experiment, respondents were asked whether they agree that "lower interest rates are needed to curb high inflation"; neutral-channel viewers whose inflation expectations rose became less likely to agree.
    Freedom House press rating. In 2014, Freedom House downgraded Türkiye's press from "partly free" to "not free" in its annual Freedom of the Press report. The paper uses this, with evidence on media ownership and regulation, as background to its classification of 13 channels as pro-government, neutral or pro-opposition.
    Koç University Household Inflation Expectations Survey (KUHIES). Koç University. 2024. Koç University Household Inflation Expectations Survey. A nationally representative monthly survey of about 2,500 Turkish adults, launched in January 2024. It asks respondents what inflation was over the past 12 months, what it will be over the next 12, which channel they watch for prime-time news and how they voted in 2023. In the paper's sample, mean expected inflation was 101%.
    News selection as a signal. Nimark, Kristoffer P., and Stefan Pitschner. 2019. "News Media and Delegated Information Choice." Journal of Economic Theory 181: 160-196. Newsrooms decide what is important enough to report, so the choice to cover a topic tells the audience something before they hear a word of the story. Orkun's finding that the amount of inflation coverage matters more than its tone fits this idea.
    The 2024 local elections. Turkey held local elections on 31 March 2024. In the run-up, election news crowded economic news out of prime time, so inflation coverage fell for reasons unrelated to viewers' beliefs. The authors use this as a natural experiment; as coverage fell, expectations fell with it.
    Bayesian updating. A way of describing how people revise beliefs; they start from a prior, see new information, and arrive at a posterior that weighs the two. People with weak priors move further when new information arrives. In the experiment, the test is whether the usual close link between a respondent's prior and posterior inflation expectation weakens after reading a news story.
    Experimenter demand effects. de Quidt, Jonathan, Johannes Haushofer, and Christopher Roth. 2018. "Measuring and Bounding Experimenter Demand." American Economic Review 108 (11): 3266-3302. Survey participants may give the answer they think the researcher wants. To reduce this, the experiment asked about posterior expectations using a differently worded question from the first.
    The polarisation of reality. Alesina, Alberto, Armando Miano, and Stefanie Stantcheva. 2020. "The Polarization of Reality." AEA Papers and Proceedings 110: 324-328. People with different political views hold systematically different beliefs about the same facts. Orkun argues that inflation is a particularly worrying place for this to happen, because monetary policy depends on a shared view of where prices are going.
    More VoxTalks Economics episodes

    How should we measure expected inflation? Ricardo Reis on which measures of inflation expectations are reliable, and how well they anticipated the surge in European inflation from 2021.
    Social media polarization. Yves Zenou on when social media pulls opinions apart and when it brings people together, the open question Orkun raises at the end of this episode.
    Related reading on VoxEU

    When the news you watch shapes the inflation you expect, a VoxEU column summarising the panel and experimental evidence from this research.
    Household inflation expectations: Taking stock of the recent research insights for monetary policy, a VoxEU column by Francesco D'Acunto, Evangelos Charalambakis, Dimitris Georgarakos, Geoff Kenny, Justus Meyer and Michael Weber on how households form and act on inflation beliefs.
    Monetary policy in the news: The FOMC's media coverage and inflation expectations, a VoxEU column showing that hawkish media coverage of the Federal Reserve lowers households' inflation expectations, especially when inflation is high.
  • VoxTalks Economics

    S9 Ep62: How well do bug bounties work?

    06/11/2026 | 20 min
    For three decades years, software makers have paid bug bounty hunters to break their code so they can make it more secure. Recently, some software companies have decided that bug bounties programmes aren't useful any more: Curl shut its bounty in January, and Intel suspended its own in September. And the discovery of the PHP flaw that sent websites offline in October came from researchers working with AI, not from a bounty hunter's report.
    Tobias Kretschmer (Imperial College London, CEPR) and his co-authors followed 86 programmes on Bugcrowd to discover how they work best. Do you run closed programmes, open only to invited hackers, or open them to all comers? And what happens now that AI is making a bug report cheaper to produce? Tim Phillips asks Kretschmer how well bug bounties are working.
    The research behind this episode:
    Zrahia, Aviram, Sarit Markovich, and Tobias Kretschmer. 2026. "Platform Openness: Evidence from Bug Bounty Programs." CEPR Discussion Paper 21970 (gated).
    To cite this episode:
    Phillips, Tim, and Tobias Kretschmer. 2026. "How well do bug bounties work?" VoxTalks Economics (podcast).

    About the guest

    Tobias Kretschmer is Professor of Strategy, Technology and Organisation at Imperial College Business School and a Research Fellow at the Centre for Economic Policy Research. He joined Imperial in 2025 from LMU Munich. His research spans competitive strategy in digital industries, platform markets, and the digital transformation of organisations.
    Research cited in this episode

    Bug bounties. Netscape launched the first technology bug bounty on 10 October 1995, offering rewards for flaws found in the Navigator 2.0 beta. Jarrett Ridlinghafer, a technical support engineer, proposed the idea after he saw enthusiasts finding bugs for free. In this paper's data, the average reward for a unique vulnerability is about $566 in private programmes and $209 in public ones. High-priority flaws average about $1,440.
    Bugcrowd connects organisations with independent security researchers. It gave the authors anonymised records of more than 480,000 submissions to 2,483 programmes, from mid-2012 to mid-2021. The data predates the widespread use of AI-generated submissions, so the paper measures the effect of openness, not the effect of AI. The authors argue that AI sharpens the same problem.
    Triage. Each submission is classified as rejected, duplicate, or unique. A unique report identifies a flaw nobody has reported before. Only the first valid report generally earns a reward, so a duplicate can be good work that arrived late. It must still be reviewed.
    Wisdom of the crowd. Francis Galton's "Vox Populi" (Nature, 1907) reported that the median of about 800 guesses at an ox's dressed weight, made at a Plymouth livestock show, was remarkably close to the true figure. Eric Raymond gave software its version in "The Cathedral and the Bazaar": "given enough eyeballs, all bugs are shallow". Maillart and co-authors tested that idea on bug bounties in 2017. Kretschmer's point is that real attackers differ in their objectives and methods; a varied crowd resembles them more closely than one employee can.
    Open and closed programmes. Anyone can join a public programme; a private one is by invitation. Bugcrowd and many other bounty platforms leave that choice to the software company rather than setting one rule for all. Many other platforms keep far tighter control, which makes this the governance decision worth studying. Kretschmer and co-authors set out the wider argument about platforms as organisations in 2022. Among programmes that never switched, public ones were 7.6% of programmes but drew about half of all submissions. Private ones accounted for about 59% of unique discoveries and nearly 80% of dollar rewards.
    Comparing like with like. Firms choose their regime deliberately, so comparing open with closed programmes misleads. The authors focus on the 86 programmes that switched once from private to public, and compare them with programmes that stayed private. The main estimates are about 23 more submissions a week, nearly six more unique vulnerabilities, 10 more new researchers, and seven more duplicates. An alternative estimator built for staggered timing gives smaller figures: about 15, three, seven, and six. The effect is front-loaded. Weekly submissions averaged about five before opening, reached about 70, then settled near 20 within 10 weeks. Opening is a choice, not an experiment, and the authors say so.
    Quality mix. This is the share of incoming submissions that are unique. It is about 16 percentage points higher in private programmes, and it falls by about 17 points when a programme opens. Opening produces more discoveries in absolute terms and a smaller share of useful reports.
    Monitoring. The authors cannot see how much firms spend on review, so they count verdicts per submission. One more weekly verdict is associated with about $139 more in weekly rewards in public programmes and about $508 in private ones; this is an association, not a causal estimate. A rough calculation in the paper suggests that opening pays only when a programme's discoveries have fallen to fewer than about 3.5 a week, before review costs. Programmes that opened averaged about 2.2. The authors say they do not identify the best moment to open, and Kretschmer makes the same point in the episode.
    Programmes that have closed. Curl ended its bounty on 31 January 2026 after paying more than $100,000 for 87 confirmed vulnerabilities since 2019. Its creator, Daniel Stenberg, reported that the confirmed rate fell from more than 15% of submissions to below 5%, which he blamed in large part on AI slop. Intel suspended its programme in September 2026, which paid up to $100,000 per flaw, and replaced it with one that pays nothing. It gave no reason. Google stopped accepting product vulnerability reports to its open source reward programme on 1 October 2026, a change it calls temporary.
    PHP2Shell. Two critical flaws, CVE-2026-109618 and CVE-2026-109619, were patched in PHP on 21 October 2026. PHP runs about 69% of websites whose server-side language is known, and many operators took sites offline as a precaution. Calif found the first route to an attack during an audit under OpenAI's Patch the Planet programme, and Wiz and OpenAI reported further ones; all used AI tools. The PHP Foundation says a core developer first saw signs of one flaw in 2024, then the fix stalled, and it calls that delay "a structural failure" of process and resources. It reports 15 CVEs and 106 reports closed as invalid, duplicate, or non-reproducible since 1 July, and says "the models don't make the calls".
    Open source software. Both curl and PHP are open source, maintained by small teams on which much of the web depends. Kretschmer argues that no single model fits. A firm may keep tight control of its core code and open the rest to its users. A related CEPR paper by Miklos Koren and co-authors, "Vibe Coding Kills Open Source", models how AI could weaken the user engagement that sustains these projects.
    More VoxTalks Economics episodes

    How well does patent screening work? Mark Schankerman on another system that depends on experts sorting good claims from bad ones.
    Will AI transform economic growth? Anton Korinek on what happens if AI starts to automate AI research.
    Related reading on VoxEU

    Platform regulation: What policymakers can and cannot learn from utility industries, a VoxEU column by Sven Werner and Tobias Kretschmer arguing that rules for digital platforms must account for the independent participants those platforms oversee.
    Cybersecurity vulnerabilities and their financial impact, a VoxEU column showing that firms with high cyber exposure earn about 0.42% lower excess returns per month.
    A brief look of the economics of open source software, a VoxEU column from 2011 by Neil Gandal on why volunteers contribute and how firms came to mix open and closed code.
  • VoxTalks Economics

    S9 Ep61: Cooperatives in the 21st century

    30/10/2026 | 27 min
    Go to work, follow orders all day, and your living standards will rise. That is the deal behind the capitalist economy. In his forthcoming book, Cooperatives in the twenty-first century, Francesco Caselli (LSE, CEPR) argues that the deal has been broken for two generations. Pay at the top keeps climbing. Pay in the middle and at the bottom has barely moved.
    The usual fixes for spiralling inequality are higher taxes on the rich and stronger unions. Francesco's answer is to change who owns the firm. In a worker cooperative there are no outside shareholders, so the profits stay with the people who produce them. In conversation with Tim Phillips, he explains which of the economic objections to cooperatives are red herrings, and which ones are more serious.
    The research behind this episode:
    Caselli, Francesco. 2026. "Worker-Managed Firms Can Curb Inequality and Protect Free Markets." VoxEU.org, 7 October.
    Caselli, Francesco. Forthcoming. Cooperatives in the Twenty-First Century: How Worker-Managed Companies Can Curb Inequality and Support Free Markets. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
    To cite this episode:
    Phillips, Tim, and Francesco Caselli. 2026. "Cooperatives in the 21st century." VoxTalks Economics (podcast).

    About the guest

    Francesco Caselli is Norman Sosnow Professor of Economics at the London School of Economics and Director of the Macroeconomics and Growth Programme at the Centre for Economic Policy Research. He is a Fellow of the British Academy and of the Econometric Society. His research spans growth, technical change and inequality, the sources of economic development, the economic and political effects of natural resource wealth, and how voters select politicians.
    Research cited in this episode

    The labour share. The labour share is the part of national income paid to workers as wages; the rest goes to the owners of capital as profit. Caselli's point is that profits flow mostly to people at the top of the income distribution, so when the labour share falls, inequality rises even if pay within firms stays the same. That is why he argues ownership, not executive pay, is the bigger part of the story.
    Wealth taxes. Tim raises Thomas Piketty, who argues for higher taxes on top incomes and on wealth. Caselli agrees in principle, but says any victory is temporary because concentrated wealth funds the campaign to reverse it. For evidence on how people respond to a wealth tax in practice, listen to Marius Brulhart on Switzerland's cantons, linked below.
    Worker bargaining power. The other standard fix, associated with labour economists such as Suresh Naidu of Columbia University, is to strengthen unions and give workers more power to bargain. Caselli puts it in the same category as wealth taxes; desirable, but vulnerable to the same political erosion.
    Mondragon. The Mondragon group of cooperatives in the Basque Country of Spain is the best known example of worker ownership at scale. Caselli cites its rules that let members keep a stake in the returns to investment after they leave, which answers the worry that departing workers will vote against investing in a future they will not share.
    WBO Italcables. When the owners of a steel wire plant in Caivano, on the outskirts of Naples, gave up on it, the workers bought it and ran it as a cooperative. Il Manifesto reported its reopening in December 2015. Caselli says the firm has since grown, invested in new equipment and exports worldwide, and uses it to question whether closures are always healthy creative destruction.
    The residual claimant. The residual claimant keeps whatever is left after the bills are paid. In a conventional firm that is the shareholder; in a cooperative it is the workers. Armen Alchian and Harold Demsetz (1972) used the idea to explain why firms have owners who monitor effort. Caselli turns it round: when a slacking colleague costs you money, you watch your colleagues.
    The compensating differential. A compensating differential is the pay people will give up for a job with other rewards, such as meaning or status; the idea goes back to Adam Smith's The Wealth of Nations (1776). Caselli says it is how cooperatives keep their most able members, and accepts there is a limit to it.
    The talent drain. Gabriel Burdin (2016) found that in Uruguay's worker-managed firms, where pay is more equal, the highest-ability members are more likely to quit. This is the objection Caselli treats as serious, and his answer may surprise listeners who expect a defence of strict pay equality.
    Pro-worker AI. Daron Acemoglu, David Autor and Simon Johnson argue that AI can be designed to complement workers rather than replace them, in CEPR Policy Insight 123, "Can We Have Pro-Worker AI?" (2023). Caselli argues that AI developers build what their customers want, and that cooperative customers would want something different.
    More VoxTalks Economics episodes

    Wealth taxes. Marius BrÃulhart uses Switzerland's cantonal wealth taxes to show what happens when the rich are taxed on what they own, the fix Caselli fears will not last.
    Inequality and creative destruction. Richard Blundell on how to get innovation-driven growth without letting the churn widen inequality.
    Related reading on VoxEU

    Worker-managed firms can curb inequality and protect free markets. Francesco Caselli's column sets out the argument of the book and answers the classic objections to cooperatives.
    Labour in the boardroom: The effects of codetermination on firm performance and wages. Simon Jager, Benjamin Schoefer and Joerg Heining find that giving workers seats on German company boards does little for wages, which suggests a minority voice is not the same as ownership.
    How AI can become pro-worker. Daron Acemoglu, David Autor and Simon Johnson propose policies to steer AI towards complementing workers rather than automating them away.
  • VoxTalks Economics

    S9 Ep60: The challenges to the international financial system

    23/10/2026 | 27 min
    The 29th Geneva Report on the World Economy examines three pressures on the international financial system at once: global imbalances, the status of the dollar, and the stability of bond markets. Two of its authors, Valentina Bruno (American University, CEPR) and Cédric Tille (Geneva Graduate Institute, CEPR), tell Tim Phillips why stocks, the dollar and US Treasuries all fell on Liberation Day in April 2025, why that could happen again, and what we should do about it. 
    So is this a rupture, or a transition in the world's financial system?
    The research behind this episode:
    Bruno, Valentina, Steven B. Kamin, Angel Ubide, and Cedric Tille. 2026. "Changing Structure and Challenges of the International Financial System: Imbalances, Currencies, and Financial Stability." Geneva Reports on the World Economy 29. Geneva: International Center for Monetary and Banking Studies; Paris and London: CEPR Press. Free to download.
    To cite this episode:
    Phillips, Tim, Valentina Bruno, and Ceric Tille. 2026. "The challenges to the international financial system”. VoxTalks Economics (podcast).

    About the guests

    Valentina Bruno is Professor of Finance at the Kogod School of Business, American University, where she holds the Arlene R. and Robert P. Kogod Eminent Scholar Chair in Finance. She is a Research Fellow of the Centre for Economic Policy Research in the Banking and Corporate Finance programme. Her research spans macroeconomics and finance, with recent work on how the US dollar transmits global financial conditions. She has worked at the World Bank and been a visiting scholar at the Federal Reserve Board.
    Cédric Tille is Professor of International Economics at the Geneva Graduate Institute, where he heads the Bilateral Assistance and Capacity Building for Central Banks programme. He is a Research Fellow of CEPR in the International Macroeconomics and Finance programme. His research spans financial globalisation, the dynamics of countries' external assets and liabilities, and the currencies used to invoice international trade. He sat on the Bank Council of the Swiss National Bank from 2011 to 2023 and previously worked for nine years at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
    Research cited in this episode

    The triple decline of April 2025. After the US announced sweeping tariffs on 2 April 2025, which President Trump called "Liberation Day", US stocks, Treasuries and the dollar fell together. Bruno argues that foreign investors did not sell their US assets; they bought protection against a falling dollar, and that hedging pushed the currency down. Much of their US equity exposure remains unhedged, so a new shock that starts in the US could trigger the same response.
    Global imbalances. Large and persistent current account surpluses in some countries, mirrored by deficits in others. Imbalances were a major policy topic before 2008, faded after the global financial crisis, and are now back. Tille argues that the headline measures have risen only modestly; the concern is China, whose trade surplus is the largest ever recorded as a share of world GDP.
    The China shock. Autor, David H., David Dorn, and Gordon H. Hanson. 2013. "The China Syndrome: Local Labor Market Effects of Import Competition in the United States." American Economic Review 103 (6): 2121-2168. Cheap imports from China benefited US consumers as a whole, but the job losses were concentrated in particular industries and places, furniture making among them. Tille uses it to explain why Germany's car workers see the current wave of Chinese competition differently from German consumers.
    The coordinated policy package. International Monetary Fund. 2026. "2026 External Sector Report: Amid Rising Imbalances, the Case for Rebalancing." The standard prescription is US fiscal consolidation, more consumption in China and more investment in Europe. The report cites IMF estimates that a coordinated package would narrow global imbalances by 0.5% of world GDP over the medium term, compared with a widening of 0.4% under current trends. Nearly all the narrowing comes from China.
    The renminbi debate. Brad Setser of the Council on Foreign Relations argues that China holds its exchange rate down and that a stronger renminbi is part of the solution. Tille notes that other economists treat the exchange rate as a sideshow to China's high savings and weak domestic demand.
    The basis trade. Pension funds, insurers and asset managers often prefer to hold Treasury exposure through futures. Hedge funds take the other side; they sell the futures, buy the bonds and earn the small gap between the two prices, funded with overnight borrowing. In calm markets the trade links the futures and cash markets and helps the Treasury sell its debt. When lenders pull back, hedge funds must sell bonds at the same moment. The report cites estimates that Cayman Islands hedge funds alone held about $1.8 trillion of Treasuries.
    March 2020 and the UK gilt crisis. In March 2020, the Covid shock set off a scramble for dollars in which even Treasuries were sold, and the Federal Reserve bought Treasuries to restore order. In September 2022, UK pension funds using liability-driven investment strategies had to sell gilts as yields rose, which pushed yields higher still, until the Bank of England stepped in. Bruno cites both as examples of safe assets at the centre of stress, where falling prices force more sales.
    The 1970s and 2008. Bruno compares today with two earlier periods when imbalances, the dollar and bond markets came under pressure together: the collapse of the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates in the early 1970s, when inflation also eroded bond values, and the years before 2008, when Asian savings and European bank lending flowed into US assets. In 2008 the stress sat in the banks. Today it sits with pension funds, insurers and hedge funds.
    Exorbitant privilege. The phrase, usually attributed to Valéry Giscard d'Estaing as French finance minister in the 1960s, describes the advantage the US gets from issuing the world's main reserve asset; foreigners accept a low return to hold it. Tille points out that the US once ran a trade deficit while earning more on its foreign assets than it paid on its liabilities. That surplus on primary income has now gone.
    The market-based trilemma. The old trilemma of international finance, associated with Robert Mundell and Marcus Fleming, says a country cannot have free capital flows, a fixed exchange rate and an independent monetary policy all at once. The report proposes a new one. Governments want to issue ever more debt, regulators want tight limits on bank balance sheets, and investors expect bond markets to work smoothly every day. You can have any two, but not all three all the time.
    "Our currency, but your problem." John Connally, US Treasury Secretary, told European counterparts in 1971 that "the dollar is our currency, but it's your problem." The report updates the line; the dollar is no longer just a currency but the operating system of global finance.
    Rupture or transition? The report opens with a remark by Mark Carney, Prime Minister of Canada, at the 2026 World Economic Forum, that the world is "in the midst of a rupture, not a transition." The authors test whether the same is true of the international financial system.
    More VoxTalks Economics episodes

    The Dollar Anchor Is Slipping. Tarek Hassan explains why the dollar became the world's safe haven and how tariffs weaken it.
    Addressing Global Imbalances. Gita Gopinath and Philip Lane on why today's imbalances put more risk on government debt and non-bank lenders.
    Stablecoins and Global Imbalances. Gilles Moec on how dollar stablecoins could pull global savings into US Treasury bills.
    Related reading on VoxEU.org

    Changing structure and challenges of the international financial system: Imbalances, currencies, and financial stability, a VoxEU column in which the four authors summarise the report.
    Geopolitical tensions and international financial fragmentation: The 28th Geneva Report on the World Economy, a VoxEU column on how geopolitical rivalry is pushing global finance to split along political lines.
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