The High Court Report

FCC v. AT&T, Inc., consolidated with Verizon Communications Inc. v. FCC | Case Nos. 25-406 & 25-567 | Docket Links: Here and Here
Question Presented: Whether the Communications Act violates the Seventh Amendment and Article III by authorizing the FCC to order payment of monetary penalties for failing to safeguard customer data, without guaranteeing carriers a jury trial.
Overview: A Missouri sheriff exploited AT&T's and Verizon's location-data programs to track hundreds of people without consent. The FCC ordered AT&T to pay $57.3 million and Verizon $46.9 million — through in-house proceedings offering no jury — raising the question whether those proceedings violate the Seventh Amendment's guarantee of a jury trial in suits at common law.
Posture: Fifth Circuit vacated AT&T's penalty; Second and D.C. Circuits upheld Verizon's and Sprint's. Supreme Court consolidated and granted cert January 9, 2026.
Main Arguments:
• AT&T and Verizon: (1) FCC forfeiture proceedings constitute "Suits at common law" demanding a jury before any final liability order enters; (2) The back-end Section 504 jury option fails — no carrier received a jury trial in 47 years under this scheme; (3) The scheme unconstitutionally conditions jury-trial rights on defying a final federal order and risking operating licenses.
• FCC and United States: (1) FCC forfeiture orders impose no binding legal obligation — a carrier may lawfully do nothing after receiving one; (2) The Seventh Amendment right attaches at the collection suit, where carriers receive a full de novo jury trial under Section 504(a); (3) The Court's 1915 ruling in Meeker v. Lehigh Valley Railroad already upheld this exact model, and founding-era practice confirms its validity.
Implications: An AT&T and Verizon victory strips the FCC of its primary enforcement tool, potentially leaving privacy, robocall, and data-security rules unenforced — and destabilizing similar penalty structures across at least five other federal agencies. An FCC and United States victory confirms that agencies may enter nine-figure penalty judgments through in-house proceedings, with regulated businesses' only realistic path running through courts that apply deferential review — not juries.
The Fine Print:
• U.S. Const. amend. VII: "In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law."
• 47 U.S.C. § 504(a): "The forfeitures provided for in this chapter shall be payable into the Treasury of the United States, and shall be recoverable...in a civil suit in the name of the United States...Provided, That any suit for the recovery of a forfeiture imposed pursuant to the provisions of this chapter shall be a trial de novo."
Primary Cases:
• SEC v. Jarkesy, 603 U.S. 109 (2024): The Seventh Amendment applies when a federal agency seeks civil penalties through in-house proceedings that parallel common-law suits; Congress cannot remove such claims from jury adjudication by assigning them to an administrative tribunal.
• Meeker v. Lehigh Valley Railroad Co., 236 U.S. 412 (1915): A statute authorizing an agency to issue non-binding monetary awards — enforceable in subsequent civil suits with jury trials — does not violate the Seventh Amendment because no question of fact passes from the jury.

Sripetch v. Securities and Exchange Commission | Case No. 25-466 | Docket Link: Here
Question Presented: Whether the SEC may seek disgorgement without proving investors suffered pecuniary harm.
Overview: Federal securities enforcement showdown asks whether the SEC must prove actual investor money losses before courts order fraudsters to surrender profits — reshaping a $6.1 billion annual enforcement tool.
Posture: Ninth Circuit affirmed disgorgement without pecuniary harm; Second Circuit requires it; Supreme Court granted cert January 9, 2026.
Main Arguments:
Sripetch (Petitioner): (1) Disgorgement without pecuniary harm functions as an unlawful penalty, not equitable relief; (2) Congress's 2021 amendments ratified Liu's definition of disgorgement, which requires restoring funds to actual victims; (3) Allowing victimless disgorgement creates incoherent statutory anomalies and lets the SEC circumvent procedural safeguards attached to civil penalties.
SEC (Respondent): (1) Disgorgement strips wrongdoers of ill-gotten gains rather than compensating victims — no loss showing required; (2) Congress deliberately omitted the "for the benefit of investors" language from the 2021 disgorgement provisions, signaling no pecuniary-harm prerequisite; (3) The statutory phrase "unjust enrichment" carries a common-law meaning that never required monetary loss.

Implications: Sripetch victory forces the SEC to document specific investor money losses before courts order disgorgement — shrinking the SEC's multibillion-dollar enforcement arsenal and potentially shielding cleverly structured fraud schemes from profit-stripping orders. SEC victory preserves the agency's ability to disgorge profits from any securities violation regardless of whether identifiable investors lost money, keeping market manipulation unprofitable even when individual victims remain unharmed on paper. Lower courts, practitioners, and compliance officers across the securities industry await the Court's answer.
The Fine Print:
15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(7): "In any action or proceeding brought by the Commission under any provision of the securities laws, the Commission may seek, and any Federal court may order, disgorgement."
15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(5): "In any action or proceeding brought or instituted by the Commission under any provision of the securities laws, the Commission may seek, and any Federal court may grant, any equitable relief that may be appropriate or necessary for the benefit of investors."

Primary Cases:
Liu v. SEC (2020): The Supreme Court held that SEC disgorgement must not exceed a wrongdoer's net profits and must "be awarded for victims" — the foundational ruling both sides now dispute.
SEC v. Govil, 86 F.4th 89 (2d Cir. 2023): The Second Circuit held that disgorgement requires proof of investor pecuniary harm, creating the circuit split that prompted the Supreme Court's cert grant.

Chiles v. Salazar | Case No. 24-539 | Argued: 10/7/25 | Decided: 3/31/26 | Docket Link: Here
Question Presented: Whether the First Amendment permits Colorado to ban licensed talk therapists from expressing viewpoints that attempt to change a minor's sexual orientation or gender identity.
Overview: Colorado's conversion therapy ban prohibited licensed counselors from saying anything designed to change a minor's sexual orientation or gender identity while expressly permitting affirming speech — a textbook viewpoint-based restriction on professional speech.
Posture: District court and Tenth Circuit denied preliminary injunction applying rational basis review; Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve circuit split.
Holding: 8-1 decision reversed the Tenth Circuit and remanded for further proceedings. Justice Gorsuch authored the majority opinion joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, Kavanaugh, and Barrett.
Majority Reasoning: (1) Colorado's law regulated the content of Chiles's speech and discriminated based on viewpoint — permitting affirming speech while forbidding speech designed to change a client's sexual orientation or gender identity; (2) licensed professionals retain full First Amendment protection and professional speech does not occupy a lesser-protected constitutional category; (3) Colorado's analogies to licensing, informed-consent, and malpractice traditions failed to establish a historical basis for suppressing professional viewpoints.
Separate Opinions:
Justice Kagan (concurring, joined by Sotomayor): Agreed Colorado's law constituted viewpoint discrimination; reserved for another day whether content-based but viewpoint-neutral laws regulating therapist speech would warrant strict scrutiny, signaling a potential path for states to regulate therapeutic speech without running afoul of the First Amendment.
Justice Jackson (dissenting): Argued Colorado's law incidentally restricted speech as a byproduct of regulating a harmful medical treatment; contended states retain traditional police power to set standards of care for licensed providers even when those standards restrict treatment-related speech, and warned the majority's ruling threatened broad categories of healthcare regulation.
Implications:
Every state conversion therapy ban covering talk therapy now faces strict scrutiny — the Constitution's most demanding standard.
Talk therapists, psychiatrists, and other speech-based healthcare providers across approximately 26 states gain powerful new First Amendment arguments against professional discipline.
States seeking to regulate therapeutic speech may pursue viewpoint-neutral restrictions, though that question remains open.
The ruling leaves undisturbed conversion therapy bans targeting physical or aversive techniques.
Future litigation will test where the line falls for viewpoint-neutral medical speech regulation.

Oral Advocates:
Petitioner (Chiles): James A. Campbell
United States (Amicus Curiae): Hashim M. Mooppan, United States Department of Justice
Respondent (Colorado): Shannon W. Stevenson, Colorado Solicitor General

The Fine Print:
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 12-245-202(3.5)(a): "any practice or treatment . . . that attempts . . . to change an individual's sexual orientation or gender identity," including "efforts to change behaviors or gender expressions or to eliminate or reduce sexual or romantic attraction or feelings toward individuals of the same sex."
First Amendment, U.S. Constitution: "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech."

Primary Cases:
National Institute of Family and Life Advocates v. Becerra (2018): Professional speech does not occupy a separate, lesser-protected constitutional category; states cannot compel or restrict professional speech without satisfying ordinary First Amendment standards.
Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of University of Virginia (1995): Viewpoint discrimination represents an egregious form of content-based regulation from which governments must nearly always abstain; the First Amendment forbids government from favoring one perspective over another on a given subject.

Timestamps:
[00:00:00] Case Preview
[00:00:50] Argument Begins
[00:00:57] Petitioner Opening Statement
[00:02:46] Petitioner Free for All Questions
[00:17:59] Petitioner Sequential Questions
[00:27:48] United States Opening Statement
[00:35:27] United States Sequential Questions
[00:45:41] Respondent Opening Statement
[01:09:00] Respondent Sequential Questions
[01:22:28] Petitioner Rebuttal

Chiles v. Salazar | Case No. 24-539 | Argued: 10/7/25 | Decided: 3/31/26 | Docket Link: Here
Question Presented: Whether the First Amendment permits Colorado to ban licensed talk therapists from expressing viewpoints that attempt to change a minor's sexual orientation or gender identity.
Overview: Colorado's conversion therapy ban prohibited licensed counselors from saying anything designed to change a minor's sexual orientation or gender identity while expressly permitting affirming speech — a textbook viewpoint-based restriction on professional speech.
Posture: District court and Tenth Circuit denied preliminary injunction applying rational basis review; Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve circuit split.
Holding: 8-1 decision reversed the Tenth Circuit and remanded for further proceedings. Justice Gorsuch authored the majority opinion joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, Kavanaugh, and Barrett.
Majority Reasoning: (1) Colorado's law regulated the content of Chiles's speech and discriminated based on viewpoint — permitting affirming speech while forbidding speech designed to change a client's sexual orientation or gender identity; (2) licensed professionals retain full First Amendment protection and professional speech does not occupy a lesser-protected constitutional category; (3) Colorado's analogies to licensing, informed-consent, and malpractice traditions failed to establish a historical basis for suppressing professional viewpoints.
Separate Opinions:
Justice Kagan (concurring, joined by Sotomayor): Agreed Colorado's law constituted viewpoint discrimination; reserved for another day whether content-based but viewpoint-neutral laws regulating therapist speech would warrant strict scrutiny, signaling a potential path for states to regulate therapeutic speech without running afoul of the First Amendment.
Justice Jackson (dissenting): Argued Colorado's law incidentally restricted speech as a byproduct of regulating a harmful medical treatment; contended states retain traditional police power to set standards of care for licensed providers even when those standards restrict treatment-related speech, and warned the majority's ruling threatened broad categories of healthcare regulation.
Implications:
Every state conversion therapy ban covering talk therapy now faces strict scrutiny — the Constitution's most demanding standard.
Talk therapists, psychiatrists, and other speech-based healthcare providers across approximately 26 states gain powerful new First Amendment arguments against professional discipline.
States seeking to regulate therapeutic speech may pursue viewpoint-neutral restrictions, though that question remains open.
The ruling leaves undisturbed conversion therapy bans targeting physical or aversive techniques.
Future litigation will test where the line falls for viewpoint-neutral medical speech regulation.

Oral Advocates:
Petitioner (Chiles): James A. Campbell
United States (Amicus Curiae): Hashim M. Mooppan, United States Department of Justice
Respondent (Colorado): Shannon W. Stevenson, Colorado Solicitor General

The Fine Print:
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 12-245-202(3.5)(a): "any practice or treatment . . . that attempts . . . to change an individual's sexual orientation or gender identity," including "efforts to change behaviors or gender expressions or to eliminate or reduce sexual or romantic attraction or feelings toward individuals of the same sex."
First Amendment, U.S. Constitution: "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech."

Primary Cases:
National Institute of Family and Life Advocates v. Becerra (2018): Professional speech does not occupy a separate, lesser-protected constitutional category; states cannot compel or restrict professional speech without satisfying ordinary First Amendment standards.
Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of University of Virginia (1995): Viewpoint discrimination represents an egregious form of content-based regulation from which governments must nearly always abstain; the First Amendment forbids government from favoring one perspective over another on a given subject.

Trump v. Barbara | Case No. 25-365 | Docket Link: Here | Argument: 4/1/26
Question Presented: Does the Executive Order denying birthright citizenship to children of undocumented or temporary-visa mothers comply with the Fourteenth Amendment's Citizenship Clause?
Overview: President Trump's Executive Order attempts to redefine birthright citizenship, challenging 150 years of constitutional understanding that birth on American soil—with narrow exceptions—creates citizenship.
Posture: District court enjoined Order; First Circuit unanimously affirmed; Supreme Court granted certiorari before judgment.
Oral Advocates:
Petitioner (United States): D. John Sauer, United States Solicitor General;
Respondent (Barbara): Cecilia Wong, American Civil Liberties Union

Main Arguments:
Government:
(1) "Subject to the jurisdiction" requires complete political allegiance, not mere obedience to law;
(2) Founding-era commentators excluded children of "transient aliens" from birthright citizenship;
(3) Wong Kim Ark addressed only domiciled aliens—temporary visitors and undocumented immigrants fall outside that holding.

Families:
(1) English common law granted citizenship based on birth, not parentage—the Framers enshrined that rule;
(2) Wong Kim Ark specifically rejected any domicile requirement, holding temporary visitors fall under U.S. jurisdiction;
(3) 8 U.S.C. § 1401(a) independently guarantees citizenship based on prevailing 1940 understanding.

Implications:
Government victory transforms citizenship from a birthright into a privilege contingent on parental immigration status—potentially questioning the citizenship of millions born to immigrant parents over generations.
Family victory preserves 150-year constitutional bedrock: birth on American soil, with narrow exceptions, makes you American.

The Fine Print:
Fourteenth Amendment, Section 1: "All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside."
8 U.S.C. § 1401(a): "The following shall be nationals and citizens of the United States at birth: (a) a person born in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof."

Primary Cases:
United States v. Wong Kim Ark (1898): U.S.-born child of Chinese immigrant parents obtained citizenship at birth; the Citizenship Clause enshrines the common-law rule of birthright citizenship.
Elk v. Wilkins (1884): Tribal Indians born on American soil lacked citizenship because they owed allegiance to their tribes—a sovereign-to-sovereign exception inapplicable to ordinary immigrants.

Timestamps:
00:01:11: United States Opening Statement
00:03:14: United States Free for All Questions
00:27:47: United States Round Robin Questions
01:09:57: Barbara Opening Statement
01:12:46: Barbara Free for All Questions
01:41:51: Barbara Round Robin Questions
02:06:10: United States Rebuttal