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Medical Safety Podcast

Dr. Adam Shehata & Dr. Amir Hamid
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16 episodi

  • Medical Safety Podcast

    Ep 16 - Beyond CRM: Designing Safer Health Systems with Dr. Ken Catchpole - Part I

    08/11/2026 | 1 h 12 min
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    Formula 1 Pit Stop Study 
    Pit stops have evolved extensively over the years. See here
    Pit stops need to be done reliably and quickly
    Analyzed the F1 pit-stop process and applied to a patient handover process for moving pediatric cardiac surgery patients to the intensive care unit
    Emphasized clearly defined roles, sequencing, leadership and structuring communication. 
    Recent work on radio-frequency identification (RFID) surgical sponges highlights the importance of research in patient safety interventions. His recent study found that RFID sponges had only a marginally acceptable benefit.
    Current barriers to developing aviation-structured CRM in medicine: lack of training from healthcare workers, a focus on individuals versus teams, and cultural resistance to system change.
    Healthcare workers don’t have to demonstrate their ability to effectively communicate before being licensed
    Failure to properly train healthcare professionals on new protocols, checklists, procedures, etc. 
    Using of ideas from other industries takes research, adaptation, and training
    CRM works to improve the performance of frontline workers. Moving beyond CRM focuses on human factors in the design of systems.
    Human factors in system design emphasizes how human behaviour and the limitations of human performance can be understood to enhance system performance.
    Human factors research initially started in the 1940’s in aviation, when focusing on pilot confusion between flaps and landing gear (two similar levers) in a basic airplane. The initial solution was to change the shape of the levers.  
    Employment of a human factors scientist in healthcare institutions may improve patient safety. 
    Human factors scientists can improve healthcare design through:Incident analysis
    Developing standards of practice
    Architecture and design of actual spaces
    Observation and understanding of different clinical environments
    Disseminating information to healthcare workers

    Dr. Catchpole’s current suggestions for improving safety in hospitals:Procurement of devices (effort spent to determine functionality before it is purchased)
    Clinical incident analysis (how harm comes from financial and staffing-related decisions, not just clinicians)
    Human factors scientists spending time in clinical environments to find where the real pain points are.

    Safety intervention worth mentioning
    Human factors or user-centred design, particularly when implementing new equipment or processes.
    A great example of a forcing function is to change epidural catheters to no longer accept Luer lock syringes.
    Other resources
    The Design of Every Day Things by Don Norman
    The Field Guide Human Error by Sidney Dekker
    Still Not Safe by Robert Wears
    Institute for Healthcare Improvement: Certified Professional in Human Factors in Healthcare 
    Random recommendations
    Ken: Go and do some art. It doesn’t need to be good. Whether it’s sculpture, gardening, cooking etc. 
    Amir: The Podcast Hard fork. The newest episode (their penultimate episode is very important: The AI mob that attacked hugging face 
    Adam: The Rescue streaming on Disney+ in Canada, which is about the rescue of a Thai Boys Soccer Team that got trapped deep in a cave that flooded.
    Thanks to Carter Ponce at VoV Media for his work in producing and promoting the show, and our intern, Dr. Sam Seshadri, a rural family medicine resident in Canada, for his research and help with post-production.
  • Medical Safety Podcast

    Ep 15 - The Tennessee Spinal Medication Incident & Mitigating the Risks of Medication Errors

    25/10/2026 | 1 h 43 min
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    7:20 Terminology 
    10:03 Timeline 
    12:00 Investigation 
    23:56 Analysis 
    31:36 Is the Swiss Cheese Model an answer? 
    35:45 Were these ‘bad apples’? 
    36:08 What if this was just isolated to one hospital? 
    38:44 How safety culture affects adherence to SOPs 
    43:16 The importance of vigilance and adherence to SOPs 
    45:33 Breach of the defences in depth 
    49:05 The near-miss that could have prevented this incident 
    51:30 Extended episodes available on Patreon 
    52:09 Mitigation strategies 
    59:54 Improving safety also improves efficiency and protects healthcare professionals 
    1:01:25 SOPs in drawing up and administering medication 
    1:04:53 CSF Lavage 
    1:09:44 James Reason’s Culpability Models 
    1:12:32 The importance of the non-punitive investigatory model 
    1:17:58 Criticism of the current level of investigation 
    1:25:33 Adam's near-miss in the OR 
    1:32:44 Other pharmacy-related medication deaths 
    1:36:13 Safety intervention worth mentioning 
    1:37:58 Who can do what tomorrow?
    1:38:57 Random recommendations
    1:41:32 Outro
    On August 14, 2026, four patients scheduled for joint replacement in a Tennessee hospital received medication that the pharmacy labelled as a spinal anaesthetic but was in fact potassium phosphate. All four patients received their spinals within three hours of each other by the same anesthesiologist, who had no way of detecting the error made by the clinical pharmacy. This led to two people becoming paraplegic, one losing significant function in their legs, and one being placed on ECMO or a heart-lung bypass machine.
    Timeline
    Technician #1 initially selected the correct mepivacaine 2% vial and placed it on a work surface. 20 min later, the technician scanned and photographed that correct vial and then determined that another vial was needed. One vial would have enough volume for five syringes, but the order called for six syringes, and so another vial was required.
    The technician retrieved potassium phosphate from a different bin that was stored close by the mepivacaine bin. Notably, the vials were lookalike drugs with extremely similar size, contents, and labelling down to the displayed names being similar. When the additional vial of potassium phosphate would not scan, the technician returned to the storage area, placed the two vials (including the correct mepivacaine 2% vial) into the potassium-phosphate bin, and retrieved two more potassium-phosphate vials.
    Technician #1 bypassed the scanning of these two vials, photographed the two vials of potassium phosphate, and placed them along with five empty syringes, and six mepivacaine labels into a bin that was passed into the mixing room.
    Technician #2, supervised by Technician #3, filled five syringes with 4 mL each and labelled them mepivacaine 2%. She also took photographs which included the potassium-phosphate vials. Technician #3 looked briefly into the medication bin that was passed into the mixing room and then sat down.
    Pharmacist #1 approved the preparation electronically. Approximately 29 seconds elapsed during the computer review. The pharmacist did not detect that both photographs showed vials of potassium phosphate rather than mepivacaine.
    James Reason’s Swiss Cheese Model is used to simplify a complex process where harms occur due to ‘holes’ in the barriers or defences in depth. We do this so that we can properly investigate and improve our safety systems, but it is not where the inquiry ends – it is the beginning of the investigation. 
    What if this was simply a ‘bad’ hospital, pharmacy, or ‘bad apples’?
    Having four ‘bad apples’ is extremely unlikely. This is almost certainly not isolated to a single organization. Even the strongest, most safety-minded pharmacies and hospitals can find learning points here. It is that mindset – that systems can always be improved – that has permitted other safety-critical industries to make such significant safety improvements over the past several decades.
    Lessons to learn
    Latent conditions must be continually rooted out.
    Segregation of high alert medications is paramount.
    Leadership walkthroughs are an important way to ensure that written policies are actually implemented.
    Human factors should be taught to all front-line medical workers, including models and policies that consider how stress and fatigue increase the likelihood of errors being made and not being trapped.
    There are tools to examine and strengthen the workplace culture.
    The use of technology (scanning the medication vials) is only one barrier. In this case, the barrier can be strengthened (likely by requiring a pharmacist-controlled resolution or some other check such as entering the drug ID number), but we also see what the investigators in this incident call an overreliance on technology.
    In upcoming episodes, Dr. Ken Catchpole talks about the use of icons (such as the biohazard symbol + colour coding), so that medication types can be easily identified from a distance.
    Medications could be colour coded with dye, as aviation fuel is. 
    People-focused solutions (training, adherence to SOPs such as telling workers to ‘read the label’ or ‘look at the pictures’) are the least effective. However, to the degree that this barrier can be improved, consideration should be given to examining the SOPs: what procedures are trained, are they actually used in practice, and are frontline workers regularly monitored for adherence to SOPs.
    Additionally barriers for error-critical medications such as intrathecal medications. In this case, the hospital introduced an additional crosschecking of work for all intrathecal medications.
    Reconciliation of the amount of medication orders vs filled by the pharmacy.
    Revision of the regulatory oversight of clinical pharmacies to help prevent recurrence should be considered.
    Other pharmacy medication errors that have resulted in death:
    In 2006, 1.5 year old Emily Jerry in the US died due to a pharmacy technician inappropriately preparing her chemotherapy. The pharmacist in that case was held criminally responsible for the death.
    In 2011 in the US, an infant died from an incorrectly compounded parenteral nutrition. 
    Andrew Sheldrick, age 8, died in Ontario, Canada in March 2016. Andrew’s medication was incorrectly compounded.
    Other resources
    APSF YouTube Video (10 min) on this incident
    News release update from the subject hospital
    Practice Patient Safety
    James Reason’s Culpability Models (see our website for diagrams)
    The Hierarchy of Intervention Effectiveness Diagram
    Safety intervention worth mentioning: Tennessee Health Facilities Report 
    Who can do what tomorrow? 
    Policymaker / government: Advocate for an aviation-style national medical investigatory body like England’s HSSIB and Norway’s UKOM, with independence from the regulator so that the entire system can be strengthened where necessary.
    Hospital CEO / Department Head: Assess the organization’s safety culture using the available tools and monitor for adherence to SOPs. Investigate near misses to remove latent conditions and prevent sentinel events.
    Practitioner: CRM and remaining vigilant with good practices.
    Random recommendations
    Amir: Properly ground coffee beans. Amir's coffee grinder.
    Adam: Scrubs Season 2 (or 11?) is out on Disney+ in Canada.
    Go to our website for the full show notes.
  • Medical Safety Podcast

    Ep 14 - Assessing CRM in Aviation with Capt. Mike Schuster

    11/10/2026 | 1 h 15 min
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    Show Notes
    CRM definitions (From TC Approved Check Pilot Manual): 
    Situational Awareness: an ability to accurately perceive what is taking place inside and outside the aircraftSystem Awareness
    Environmental Awareness
    Awareness of time and anticipation of future events

    CooperationTeam building and maintaining
    Consideration of others
    Support of others
    Resolving conflicts

    Decision MakingProblem diagnosis
    Option generation
    Risk assessment
    Option selection
    Outcome review

    Leadership and Managerial Skills
    Use of authority and assertiveness
    Providing and maintaining standards
    Planning and coordination
    Workload management
    CRM has evolved in aviation
    CRM started as a pilot-led and evidence-driven response to aviation accidents in the 1970s and 80s where team performance led to accidents, rather than mechanical failure
    See Episode 3 Show Notes
    Evaluating pilots-in-training in both their technical and CRM skills is structured and formalized. 
    In every pilot license, there is a ground school, a written exam, flying lessons, and a flight test as well as minimum flight hours and experience. They are evaluated on their technical and non-technical skills. 
    Flight tests include scenario-based oral exams similar to physician board exams.
    Currently pilot training programs in Canada are starting to shift from modular or block-style training (private license, adding night and instrument ratings, etc.) to a more integrated philosophy to train multi-crew airline pilots from day one. 
    A Pilot Proficiency Check (PPC) acts as a type rating that is added onto an existing pilot license for a specific type of airplane. This happens roughly every six months and reviews both normal procedures and emergency procedures. 
    Given the basics of CRM described above, pilots are marked based on four global points (effective, acceptable, poor, unacceptable) while examiners think about possible CRM elements including: Did they anticipate the threat? 
    Do they make inquiries for more information? 
    Do they consider downstream consequences
    How was the situational awareness? 
    Did they communicate appropriately?
    How did they manage their workload?
    How did they get rid of distractions?
    Was the aim achieved?

    Errors are deemed as “critical," "major," or "minor," each with their own repercussions on the outcome of the flight test. 
    The CRM framework allows us to trace back errors observed and trace back why they might have occurred.
    In aviation the Pilot Proficiency Check is a check on a specific aircraft where a line check is run by the airline to determine the safety and effectiveness of company-specific policies and procedures. 
    Situational Awareness
    “We all have our own mental models about a certain situation, and if it is accurate, this means that we have good situational awareness."
    We may have fixation-induced loss of situational awareness through task saturation (e.g. intubation, troubleshooting landing gear)
    Captain Schuster imagines workload management in three buckets: information can be perceived, processed, and then acted upon. Each must be balanced to function well. 
    Cooperation
    Cooperation: the ability to work effectively as a team. 
    Cooperation begins in the formation of the team and considers the skills and attitudes of individual members. 
    Basic conflict resolution techniques can aid in examining the root cause of errors. 
    A debrief of the exercise is just as important as completing the full exercise in examining the components of CRM that failed and that were successful.
    Decision-making
    Decision-making includes identifying the problem, generating options for action, assessment of the risk, willingness to reassess the plan, and analysis of the outcome.
    Decision-making in aviation is most often evaluated in the debrief, where the examiner and the trainee discuss the thought processes of the trainee and hypothetical cases.  
    “The event in the simulator is the practice, the learning takes place in the debrief.”
    Leadership, Managerial Skills (and followship)
    Designated leadership (e.g. Captain) versus functional leadership (context-specific, depending on who has the most relevant experience)
    Followership: giving appropriate feedback at the appropriate time, asking questions if unsure, suggesting alternate courses of action (which requires good situational awareness).
    Authority gradient: if too steep, people will not speak up when necessary. If too flat or out of balance, there is a risk of failure of leadership.
    Good leaders use functional leadership to achieve goals. (e.g., the First Officer has more experience at a particular airport).
    Good followers will use graduated assertiveness when necessary (e.g., the Probing, Alerting, Challenge, Emergency (PACE) model described in Episodes 3 & 4).
    Leadership on the flight deck incorporates planning and coordination. For example, in November, Captain Schuster will ask his First Officer, “Have you needed to de-ice yet this season? Have you had a chance to look over the checklist in advance so there aren’t any surprises?” 

    Workload management is also a part of leadership, where the leader assesses the situation and then delegates appropriate tasks with clear communication while ensuring they are not task saturated.
    Appropriate feedback to trainees and to their training unit allows both individual and system-wide deficits to be studied and improved on. 

    CRM in medicine
    The concept of a Pilot/Physician Proficiency Check (PPC) where a physician must recertify their proficiency at normal and emergency procedures, exists in certification courses such as ACLS, ATLS, and NRP. We do not have specialty or institution-wide proficiency checks after the specialty exams.
    Medicine remains very individual-focused as opposed to team-focused (e.g. one doctor runs the code and must think of the next steps of action, whereas in a flight emergency the captain often gives control of the aircraft to the first officer, leaving them free to think about next steps). 
    Medicine has started to recognize the importance of debriefing after resuscitation or critical events.

    Other Resources
    TC Approved Check Pilot Manual. 
    Re-enactment of a check flight and assessment of CRM (YouTube 19 mins). The issue starts in the briefing where the First Officer lacks trust due to the Captain’s apparent lack of knowledge. This leads to an in-flight emergency that results from a poorly managed abnormal event: an electrical problem. During the running of the checklist, no one is flying the airplane (monitoring the airspeed, which was previously too fast and the thrust levers retarded), the stick shaker activates, indicating an aerodynamic stall is imminent and the crew recovers from the Undesired Aircraft State (UAS). During the debrief, we see the learning take place.
    Safety Intervention Worth Mentioning:
    University of Texas Human Factors Research Project: Threat and Error Management. Published December 2006. 

    Who can do what tomorrow? 
    Policy Level: Read the TEM paper linked above to see what can be done to improve training and evaluation of non-technical skills in medicine. 
    Hospital CEO/Department Level: Consider how improving non-technical skills can improve working conditions and team satisfaction. 
    Practitioner Level: Read the TEM paper.

    Random Recommendations
    Mike: Enjoy a nice walk outside.
    Adam: EPIC (Full Official Concept Album on YouTube Music) by Jorge Rivera-Herrans. See also these “animatics” (YouTube fan-based sketch animations)
    Amir: Promethea Unbound  by Mike Mariani
    Thanks to Carter Ponce at VoV Media and our intern, Dr. Sam Seshadri for help with post-production.
  • Medical Safety Podcast

    Ep 13 - The NCEPOD with CEO Dr. Marisa Mason

    27/09/2026 | 1 h 16 min
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    Watch the full video podcast on YouTube here:
    https://youtu.be/wDgv5gnRDX8?si=T6jKII0V5-QI9cTs

    Show Notes
    The National Confidential Enquiry into Patient Outcome and Death (NCEPOD) is an independent UK charity and company that started in 1988 that reviews medical and surgical care in the UK to improve care for patients Started with anesthetists focused on post-operative outcomes, in response to post operative deaths eventually adopted by surgeons, and finally into all medical practices 
    Periodically release reports on key topics related to quality of care
    Consists of a small team of non-clinical staff, clinicians, and a board of trustees 
    Funding comes from the NHS England directed through  departments of Health and Social Care.
    According to Dr. Mason, the mandate of the NCEPOD is to “use clinicians to highlight where they think they can improve care."

    NCEPOD reports, while not being formal academic research, can act as the initial bridge to new safety interventions; the NCEPOD process attempts to identify common issues in different care environments and works on reports to provide recommendations; it exists somewhere between an audit and a Quality improvement body
    The process of the NCEPOD (roughly two years) includesAn open call for topics, 
    An audit of potential projects, 
    Discussion with relevant professional bodies,
    A final discussion with the Healthcare Quality Improvement Partnership for funding of a topic

    Following this, the NCEPOD—advised by the Royal Colleges, professional organizations, patients, caregivers, and charitiesCreates surveys to go out to clinicians and patients for case series
    Clinicians then independently, voluntarily, and confidentially review cases
    The data is pooled, and narrative recommendations are created
    The recommendations are reviewed by all stakeholders prior to publishing

    In England, every hospital has internal designated NCEPOD “local reporters” who serve as intermediaries and repositories of adverse events/NCEPOD relevant issues and liaise with the NCEPOD
    The NCEPOD looks at a large number of incidents and institutions to assess quality of care, and shortcomings broadly, whereas the Health Services Safety Investigations Body (HSSIB) investigates individual cases to identify broader issues related to patient safety.The NCEPOD is similar to a deductive approach
    HSSIB uses an inductive approach
    Both branches may use multiple cases to draw a conclusion about patient care but have different starting points and philosophies and may refer to each other as appropriate

    Examples of NCEPOD work include the introduction of NCEPOD “Theatres,”dedicated emergency operative rooms as opposed to emergency procedures bumping elective operating room slates into the evening or night. 
    Dr. Mason is particularly proud of the NCEPOD for its part inProviding clinical voice for clinicians who want to make a difference
    Having a formal process for reviewing individual cases that occasionally lead to specific patients having an improved outcome
    Changes to trauma care in the UK to an organized service centred around major trauma centres. Trauma: Who Cares? (2007)

    Similar to the Transportation Safety Board (for aviation) watchlist, the NCEPOD has a list of “Common Themes” which highlight key themes in quality of patient care
    Dr. Mason’s key suggestions in advocating for the creation of something similar to NCEPOD in Canada: Highlight how the work is directly relevant to patients while engaging clinicians as opposed to punishing them. 
    Acts as a protective mechanism for the healthcare institution.  
    Emphasizes clinicians volunteering their time to reflect on cases of other clinicians and generate insights into how care could have been improved

    Safety Intervention Worth Mentioning:
    NCEPOD Reports – see below. 
    NCEPOD Audit Tools for various hospital departments. 

    Random Recommendations
    Dr. Mason: “Try to find the lightheartedness where you can.”
    Adam: Watch the World Cup. Look for something to bring us all together. 
    Amir: Podcast Search Engine.

    Other Resources
    Trauma: Who Cares? (2007) (NCEPOD)
    Testicular Torsion (NCEPOD)
    Transition from Child into Adult Healthcare (NCEPOD)
    Common Themes (NCEPOD)
    Emergency surgery in children and young people (2025) (NCEPOD)
    Getting it Right First Time Programme
  • Medical Safety Podcast

    Ep 12 - The NCEPOD Common Themes 2024 Report

    13/09/2026 | 1 h 8 min
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    Show Notes
    The National Confidential Enquiry into Patient Outcomes and Death (NCEPOD) - Common Themes 2024 Report
    The NCEPOD Common Themes Report was first published in 2018 as a “living report” of key topics to be discussed in the care of hospital patients. It was subsequently updated in 2024 to the current edition with a stronger focus on communication, transition planning, and follow-up.  
    Common Thread: health care often does not fail due to technical proficiency, rather, it fails due to lack of teamwork, weak communication, poor documentation, and delayed recognition of deterioration.
    The NCEPOD may serve as a useful guide for healthcare workers and policymakers looking for ways to optimize patient safety and flow through the institution. 

    Safety Intervention Worth Mentioning: NCEPOD reports
    The National Confidential Enquiry into Patient Outcomes and Death (NCEPOD) - Common Themes 2024 Report

    Random recommendations
    Adam: CBC’s The Expert Witness from Uncover and watch out for CBC’s See You in Court (Season 2) podcast.
    Amir: Journal for both positive and negative emotions in your life
Altri podcast di Medicina
Su Medical Safety Podcast
Dr. Adam Shehata (former professional pilot turned physician) and Dr. Amir Hamid (anesthetist and emergency medicine physician) discuss how to improve our healthcare system by integrating human factors into systems safety, including medical incident investigation and proactive safety measures.
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